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Science & SocietyEver since Galton’s classic demonstration of the wisdom
of crowds in estimating the weight of a slaughtered ox,
scholars of the mind and the public alike have been
fascinated by the counterintuitive accuracy achieved by
simply averaging a number of people’s estimates. Sur-
prisingly, individuals can, to some extent, harness the
wisdom of crowds within the confines of their own mind
by averaging self-generated, nonredundant estimates.
The powerful principle of judgment aggregation
Sir Francis Galton, the Victorian polymath, was an outspo-
ken elitist and skeptical of the value of democratic judgment.
In 1906, he attended a livestock fair at which visitors
guessed the weight of a butchered and dressed ox. Although
the 787 estimates varied widely, the median estimate was
only 9 pounds (0.8%) off the mark. The remarkable precision
of the vox populi surprised Galton: ‘This result is (. . .) more
creditable to the trust-worthiness of a democratic judgment
than might have been expected’ [1]. Since Galton’s demon-
stration of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ [2], research in psychology,
economics, political science, biology, statistics, and comput-
er science has time and again demonstrated how aggregat-
ing diverse judgments frequently – and sometimes
dramatically – increases accuracy because nonredundant
errors cancel each other out. Surprisingly, a lone individual
can also enlist the wisdom of crowds by averaging self-
generated, nonredundant estimates [3–12]. We review evi-
dence for this ‘wisdom of the inner crowd’, and consider how
it can be produced, how its accuracy can be improved, and
whether people use it to their advantage.
How wise is the inner crowd?
Stroop first demonstrated the wisdom of the inner crowd in
the 1930s [10]. His participants ranked identical-looking
weights according to their heaviness, with some partici-
pants returning up to 50 times to rank the same set of
weights anew. When Stroop averaged across ever more
rankings originating from either different people or the
same person, he found that the correlation with the true
ranking of the weights increased to the same extent for
both real and inner crowds. Because the weights looked
identical, participants were not able to remember their
rankings from previous sessions. The errors of repeated
rankings by the same participants were thus as indepen-
dent as those by different participants. Stroop’s results1364-6613/
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be as powerful as real crowds.
Having lain dormant for some time, the wisdom-of-the-
inner-crowd effect has recently been rediscovered. The
benefits of averaging multiple estimates provided by the
same person have been demonstrated for various general
knowledge quantities (proportions [3,5,6,8,11], historical
dates [4,8], and correlations [12]). However, evidence of
averaging benefits is somewhat mixed for both general
knowledge questions without clear-cut boundaries for rea-
sonable answers [8,9] and estimates of social consensus (a
correlational accuracy measure showed no benefits, but a
deviation-based accuracy measure did) [7], and the only
study investigating the quality of confidence judgments
found no benefits of harnessing the inner crowd [13]. In
summary, most – but not all – studies have found evidence
for the wisdom of the inner crowd. Some of the differences
in results may stem from methodological differences (e.g.,
in how averaging was implemented or how accuracy was
measured); others may be due to the knowledge domains
and types of judgments investigated. Future research is
needed to understand the boundary conditions of the wis-
dom of the inner crowd (see Box 1 for one approach).
With the exception of Stroop’s study [10], research has
found real crowds to produce larger averaging gains than
equally sized inner crowds [4,8,9,11–13]. The reason is that
their errors are less redundant than are those observed in
inner crowds [4]. In real crowds, returns therefore diminish
at a slower rate when more estimates are added [9,12],
because error redundancy imposes an upper ceiling on how
much and how quickly accuracy can be increased by error
cancellation [9]. Adding another person is thus likely to
generate more benefit than is asking oneself once more
[12].
How to foster the wisdom of the inner crowd?
Given that reducing error redundancy should increase
averaging gains within a person, an obvious question is
this: What reduces error redundancy within a person? The
key insight is that error redundancy reflects, among other
things, the amount of redundant information contained in
multiple estimates – either by the same person or by
different people [6,13]. Consistent with this, averaging
gains are larger for people with lower (vs higher) working
memory spans [6]. These estimates are probably based on a
smaller sample of information retrieved from memory;
smaller samples randomly drawn from the same underly-
ing distribution are necessarily less redundant than larger
samples. Error redundancy also decreases when previous
estimates are not permitted to hold strong sway over
subsequent ones. Specifically, techniques that reduce the
‘control’ of previous estimates can reduce error redundancy
Box 1. When to enlist the inner crowd
The probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model [15] was devel-
oped to study advice taking (i.e., with one judge and one advisor).
However, it also offers a framework to investigate the ecological
conditions under which averaging one’s self-generated estimates
outperforms the strategy of betting on the more accurate set of self-
generated estimates [3,5]. The model’s parameters are:
 The probability p of identifying the better set of estimates, that is, a
person’s skill to correctly predict whether, overall, the first or
second estimates are more accurate.
 The accuracy ratio A, which is defined as the ratio of the errors of
both sets of estimates (larger error divided by smaller).
 The redundancy of the errors operationalized as the ‘bracketing
rate’ Br, that is, the proportion of questions for which the answers
have errors of different signs and thus errors cancel each other out
(with higher Brs indicating lower error redundancy).
Figure I shows a PAR model analysis of the wisdom of the inner crowd
[5]. The PAR model illustrates that when Br is high enough (i.e., error
redundancy is low enough), always averaging is more accurate than is
choosing the better set of estimates, even with perfect skill (p = 1). Data
are from a study [5] that compared a dialectical-bootstrapping condition
(using the consider-the-opposite technique) with a reliability condition (in
which participants re-estimated a quantity without special instructions).
In both conditions, the first and second sets of estimates were similarly
accurate (i.e., both A values were close to 1) and had small to moderately
large bracketing rates. Most importantly, the dialectical condition was
located slightly above the iso-accuracy curve for p = 1; that is, even
someone who always detects the better set of estimates would not
outperform the wisdom of the inner crowd. The only way to do so would
be to abandon averaging on a trial-by-trial basis under the appropriate
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Figure I. The cognitive–environmental niche for the wisdom of the inner crowd.
The lines for different values of p represent iso-accuracy curves, that is,
combinations of accuracy ratios (A) and bracketing rates (Br) for which
averaging the estimates versus choosing the better set of estimates (with skill
p) return the same accuracy. For combinations above an iso-accuracy curve,
averaging is better than choosing with skill p; for combinations below, choosing
is better. Data are from [5]; error bars show 95% highest density intervals (HDIs).
Adapted from [5].
Science & Society Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2014, Vol. 18, No. 10and boost averaging gains [4,11]. At least two classes of
such techniques are available.
One approach capitalizes on the power of forgetting. For
example, increasing the time delay between subsequent
estimates – and thus freeing latter estimates from the
traction forces of former estimates – can increase averaging
gains [11]. A second approach takes advantage of the mind’s
ability to construct alternative realities. People can be
actively prompted to base their second estimate on different
assumptions, pieces of information, inference methods, and
elicitation procedures [4,12]. One way to achieve this process
of ‘dialectical bootstrapping’ [4,5,14] is to ask people to
‘consider the opposite’ when making a new estimate. This
prompt has been shown to decrease error redundancy and
increase averaging gains [4,5] (but see also [14]).
Do people harness the wisdom of their inner crowd?
People underestimate the benefit to be gained from aver-
aging their own opinions with those of advisors [2,15]. But
do they appreciate the potential gains of taking their own
‘advice’? Indeed, people asked to give a final estimate in
light of their self-generated previous ones tend to combine
them (i.e., to give a final estimate located somewhere
between the first two) [5,8], although few people strictly
average their estimates by giving equal weight to both of
them [5,8]. Moreover, when explicitly asked to decide
between choosing their first estimate, choosing their sec-
ond estimate, or averaging both estimates, decision
makers most frequently opt for averaging [3].
People are more likely to combine their estimates if they
actively challenge the premises of their first answer in the
process of generating a second one [5]. Prompting people toadopt more than one perspective on the same problem – to
‘consider the opposite’ – may make them aware of conflict-
ing, yet legitimate, assumptions and reasons. Combining
the resultant estimates is an elegant tool for trading off
these conflicting realities. Another factor conducive to
combination is the magnitude of disagreement between
two estimates. The larger the numerical difference be-
tween the two estimates, the more inclined people are to
combine them [5]. One interpretation is that they are
especially motivated to hedge against the risk of selecting
the wrong estimate when disagreements are large.
Although people generally tend to combine their self-
generated estimates, they also often choose among them
[3,5,8]. Do they abandon combining under the right cir-
cumstances? To date, the research indicates that this is not
the case. People seem unable to outperform the inner
crowd and would be better off always strictly averaging
their estimates [3,5,8]. Although people tend to select the
more accurate of their estimates when choosing between
them [3], this accuracy in spotting the better estimate does
not suffice to outperform the averaging of estimates [3,5].
Averaging is not superior in every environment [3,5,15]
(see Box 1 for an explanation), but in the environments
investigated so far, the accuracy of the inner crowd was
unsurpassed.
Concluding remarks: how to exploit the inner crowd
Individuals can boost the accuracy of their estimates by
consulting an outer crowd or enlisting an inner crowd
(Figure 1). With regard to the inner crowd, several chal-
lenging questions remain to be answered. First, the bound-
ary conditions of this mental device need to be delineated505
Wisdom of crowds
Combine your esmate
with the others’ esmates [2].
Blinding and waing
Blind yourself to your previous
esmates [10,15] and/or wait
between esmates [11]
and then combine your esmates.
To combine or not to combine
Unless you have very strong reasons to put more (or all) weight on some esmate(s), combine with equal weights [2,5,15];
also combine if large errors are costly (i.e., hedge against the risk of choosing the worse esmate) [2,5,12].
Dialeccal bootstrapping:
Play your own devil’s advocate
(e.g., using the consider-the-
opposite technique) and then combine
your esmates [4,5].
Write down first esmate.
Esmates of
other people available?
Can you blind yourself to your
previous esmate(s) [10] and/or
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Figure 1. Decision tree for deciding when and how to use the inner crowd.
Science & Society Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 2014, Vol. 18, No. 10(e.g., can it also be generalized to judgments that are not
quantitative?). Second, research can help people to exploit
their inner crowd by identifying further tools that can
reduce error redundancy and increase the propensity to
harness the inner crowd under the appropriate circum-
stances (Box 1). Three tools have already been found – time
delay [11], consider-the-opposite technique [4,5], and dif-
ferent methods of assessment [12] – but other easy-to-use
techniques are likely to exist. A third open question con-
cerns the conditions under which people spontaneously
generate more than one opinion. The fourth challenge is
to identify people who could benefit more than others from
enlisting the inner crowd. For instance, do elderly people
with declining cognitive resources benefit more (akin to
people with lower working memory span [6])?
The surprising accuracy of the vox populi challenged
Galton’s elitist weltanschauung. Likewise, the wisdom of
the inner crowd rehabilitates the existence of conflicting
thoughts and opinions within a single mind. Rather than
striving to identify one ‘superior’ response, decision makers
can benefit from actively consulting different opinions with-
in their mind and harnessing their wisdom by aggregation.
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